> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.neuraltrust.ai/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

> ## Agent Instructions
> These docs cover three products: TrustGate (AI agent gateway), TrustGuard (runtime security), and TrustTest (AI red teaming). Start from each product overview for the definition and How it works. Prefer the .md URL next to a page in /llms.txt when you need the full article. Use /llms-full.txt for a single-file dump of the site.

# NIST AI RMF

> How TrustGate and TrustGuard support the GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE and MANAGE functions of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework.

<Note>
  The AI RMF is voluntary and organizational — there is no certification to hold.
  NeuralTrust supplies the technical controls and evidence your risk programme cites
  under each function.
</Note>

## Coverage at a glance

| Function    | What it asks                              | Coverage             |
| ----------- | ----------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
| **GOVERN**  | Policies, roles, accountability           | 🟢 Partially covered |
| **MAP**     | Context, categorization, inventory        | 🟢 Partially covered |
| **MEASURE** | Analyse, benchmark, monitor, track        | ✅ Covered            |
| **MANAGE**  | Prioritize, respond, recover, communicate | ✅ Covered            |

## GOVERN

*Cultivate a culture of risk management: policies, accountable roles, documented processes.*

| Capability                                                   | What it evidences                                                                                  |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [Roles and permissions](/platform/users)                     | Who holds which level of access, per product                                                       |
| [SSO](/platform/sso) and [SCIM provisioning](/platform/scim) | Access granted and revoked through your identity provider rather than by hand                      |
| [Break the glass](/platform/break-glass)                     | A documented, auditable emergency path                                                             |
| [Audit logs](/platform/audit-logs)                           | Sign-ins, role and membership changes, SSO and SCIM, and product configuration — retained 365 days |
| [Policy history](/trustguard/concepts/policies#history)      | What a policy was before it changed, and when                                                      |

## MAP

*Establish context and categorize the system — what it is, what it touches, what could go wrong.*

| Capability                                                            | What it evidences                                                                                                                                                     |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [Registry](/trustgate/registry/overview)                              | The inventory: every [model provider](/trustgate/registry/models) and [MCP server](/trustgate/registry/mcp) a gateway may reach, with the credential and who holds it |
| [Gateways](/trustgate/concepts/gateways)                              | Which gateways exist and what each fronts                                                                                                                             |
| [Detector catalog](/trustguard/detectors/overview)                    | The fixed set of risks inspected for, which also makes the boundary of what is not inspected explicit                                                                 |
| [End-user attribution](/trustgate/observability/end-user-attribution) | Which population a system serves, behind shared keys                                                                                                                  |

## MEASURE

*Analyse and monitor AI risk with quantitative and qualitative methods.*

| Capability                                        | What it evidences                                                                               |
| ------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [Observe mode](/trustgate/policies/overview#mode) | A policy's decision recorded without enforcement — the measurement step before the control step |
| Findings                                          | Which detector fired, on which side, what it decided, with an evidence summary                  |
| [Alerts](/platform/alerts)                        | Prioritized, deduplicated detections correlated across both products                            |
| [Event schema](/platform/event-schema)            | The exact record shape, for your own analysis downstream                                        |
| [SIEM forwarding](/platform/alert-integrations)   | Findings as OCSF Detection Findings, into your existing analytics                               |

## MANAGE

*Act on measured risk: prioritize, respond, recover, communicate.*

| Capability                                                                                                                                          | What it evidences                                                                    |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [Enforce mode](/trustgate/policies/overview#mode)                                                                                                   | Treatment actually applied — blocked, or rewritten in place where masking is set     |
| [Guardrails](/trustgate/policies/guardrails)                                                                                                        | Inspection chosen per risk and per application                                       |
| [Rate limits](/trustgate/policies/rate-limiter), [budgets](/trustgate/policies/llm-budget), [size limits](/trustgate/policies/request-size-limiter) | Bounded consumption per scope                                                        |
| [Routing fallback](/trustgate/llm/routing#fallback)                                                                                                 | Recovery: an ordered fallback chain and load-balanced pools when a provider degrades |
| [Access levels](/trustgate/access/overview)                                                                                                         | Containment — who reaches which server, revocable                                    |
| [Alert integrations](/platform/alert-integrations)                                                                                                  | Communication to the channels operators watch                                        |

## Where NeuralTrust stops

**GOVERN and MAP are partly organizational.** Accountability structures, legal and
regulatory awareness, workforce competence, intended purpose, affected populations
and foreseeable misuse are written and decided by people. The products evidence
that access and configuration were controlled, and inventory what is connected —
not what the system is *for*. End-user attribution is
[not an authenticated identity](/trustgate/observability/end-user-attribution#not-an-identity).

**Model TEVV sits elsewhere.** MEASURE also covers accuracy, fairness and validity
benchmarks for the model itself. That is testing work, and it belongs to
[TrustTest](/trusttest/create/threat-detection/overview) rather than to the runtime
path.

**Streaming enforcement.** Streamed output is evaluated, but where enforcement can
act depends on the path. Through the gateway the stream is buffered and inspected
after the client drains it, so findings are recorded rather than refused; on the
[LiteLLM](/integrations/litellm) path accumulated output is scanned during the
stream, where `block` stops later chunks. Enforce on the request leg when a response
must be stopped.

**Profiles and tagging.** Nothing produces or consumes an AI RMF profile, and
findings carry no category identifiers. This page is the mapping.

<Note>
  See also [EU AI Act](/platform/compliance/eu-ai-act), [ISO/IEC 42001](/platform/compliance/iso-42001) and [OWASP LLM Top 10](/platform/compliance/owasp-llm-top-10).
</Note>
